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THE APACHE FRONTIER. JACOBO UGARTE AND SPANISH-INDIAN RELATIONS
IN NORTHERN NEW SPAIN, 1769-1791. By Max 1. Moorhead. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. Pp. xiv, 310. Illus., maps, bibliog.,
index. $6.95.
FROM THE CONQUEST of New Mexico on the Apache Indians proved a
formidable obstacle to successful settlement, an obstacle ultimately removed
by the U.S. Army with the aid of Apache scouts. Because of their hardh
ness and nomadic way of life the Apaches frustrated all attempts to conquer them completely or to induce them to live in permanent villages and
to abandon their raids.
Life in the Provincias Internas, New Spain's northern provinces, was
harsh and often unattractive, but the land had to be held to protect mining
regions farther south. Many Spanish officers spent a large part of their
careers in this thankless frontier duty. Considering the scarcity of troops
and of effective weapons, the great expanse of territory, and the number
and skill of the enemy the Spaniards did remarkably well in their endless
struggle with the Apache.
One of those who spent many years in the Provincias Internas was
Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola. When he was appointed governor of Coahuila in
1767, he had behind him thirty-five years of military service. On arriving in
Monclova late in 1769 Ugarte found the government buildings in ruins. He
requested funds from the viceroy, but was told to assess the local citizens.
Unwilling to add to the burdens of the impoverished vecinos, Ugarte put
up with the dilapidated buildings. The settlers of the province asked for
weapons with which to defend themselves, and Ugarte requested the viceroy to provide three hundred muskets. Nearly three years passed before
two hundred guns arrived. The viceroy insisted that the citizens pay the
full cost. Ugarte spared the settlers this burden, with the result that the
unpaid balance was charged to him. Such was life in the Provincias
Internas.
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Although the frontier presidios had only from thirty to one hundred and
fifty men, even when Apache raiders struck at many places on the same
day requests for additional troops were usually denied. When, in 1771,
Ugarte appealed for more men to check the Apache, the viceroy remarked
that the "maxim of the captains of presidios is to increase the number of
men in their garrisons" and that their "respective allotments always seem
small." In the whole province of Coahuila Ugarte had only 137 men at
his disposal, and they were stationed in three presidios.
The morale of frontier troops was usually low, for they were generally
in debt to their captains, who had a monopoly of sales. This practice was
abolished in 1772, and thereafter the troops fared better. But because the
officers' pay was low, Ugarte and others supported the earlier practice.
Although general and limited campaigns were launched against the
Apache, the results were rarely all that was expected. The Spanish position
was greatly improved by the pressures brought to bear on the Apache by
the Comanche. The Spaniards therefore cultivated this rivalry, and, as
elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the Indians thus contributed to
their own ruin.
In November 1777, Ugarte was transferred to the governorship of
Sonora, where he served until 1782. In Sonora, Opata Indians were enlisted in presidio companies, and they made an effective fighting force
under Spanish officers. At the conclusion of his term in Sonora Ugarte
served briefly as governor of Puebla, then in 1786 was promoted to the
position of Comandante General of the Provincias Internas. The commandancy general was designed especially for New Spain's northern frontier, where Indian warfare was the principal problem. Unlike a captain
general, the commander general had no non-military functions.
There are a number of parallels between Spanish relations with the
Indians and those of Anglo-Americans later. In both cases it was felt that
if the Indians would become farmers and adopt a "civilized" way of life,
all would be well. The difference was that the Spaniards were willing to
accept such Indians among them, while the Anglo-Americans were not.
And the Spaniards employed Apache to fight Apache, a praCtice that
General George Crook "invented" in Arizona a century later.
The location of the presidios was a much discussed problem. At one
time they were moved, over Ugarte's protests, some distance from the
settlements, in the belief that the troops could intercept Apache raiders.
They could not, and the presidios were moved back to the settlements. But,
as Dr. Moorhead states, 'Wherever the presidios were placed, the interior
settlements . .. had always been vulnerable whenever the Apache took
the offensive. The best protection, therefore, was a continuous series of
offensive operations, which would carry the war into enemy territory and
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keep them on the defensive.. . Too few in numbers, poorly armed and
equipped, and demoralized by high prices and low pay, the frontier soldiers
performed a heroic but ineffective service. The best they could do was
make the enemy pay dearly for his victories. How they held their thin
line against the Apache invasions and achieved some measure of respite
for the harried settlers can be better explained in diplomatic than in purely
military terms. Force having failed, the Spaniards resorted to stratagem."
Dr. Moorhead has added another excellent and scholarly work to the
growing list of books on the Spanish Borderlands. He avoided the conventional pitfall of biographers and did not attempt to prove Ugarte right in
every instance, though a biographer of Juan de Ugalde might view relations between the two men differently. Books such as this should generate
a feeling of admiration for the unheralded men who grimly maintained
the frustrating struggle to hold the outposts of Spain's far-Hung empire.
Texas Christian University
DONALD E. WORCESTER
THE CONQUEST OF APACHERIA. By Dan L. Thrapp. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 408. lllus., maps, bibliog., index.
$6·95·
As THE Civil War drew to a close, Southwesterners began focusing their
attention inward toward the development of the resources of their region,
toward building on a permanent basis, much as had the eastern portion of
the United States in the decades after the War of 1812. But just as frontiersmen in the East had discovered half a century earlier, Sputhwesterners
soon found that the native inhabitants had to be confronted before the
mines, ranches, and farms could be worked in safety. Foremost among these
tribes in New Mexico and Arizona were the Western Apache-the Chiricahua, Warm Springs, Cileno, Mogollon, Mimbreno, Aravaipa, Pinaleno,
Coyotero, White Mountain, Mescalero, and Lipan. Their name itselfApache-had come from a Zuni word meaning "enemy," and so indeed they
were considered by almost all white settlers, both in the Southwest and in
Sonora and Chihuahua. So fierce were these loosely related groups that the
Spaniards had given the name Apacherfa to the area, although it contained
dozens of other tribes.
When ,Southwesterners turned to coping with the Apache, many problems manifested themselves. The Indian Bureau by 1865 had developed
no long-range philosophy for coping with the Apache or other Southwestern tribes. And during the four years of civil conflict to the east, the
Apache had taken advantage of the absence of troops to increase the intensity of their looting and killing-not without ample provocation, however. Such incidents as the Bascom Affair and the murder of Mangas
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Coloradas left a lingering legacy of hatred; The return of federal troops to
the region presaged a confrontation of life-and-death proportions. Yet,
hampering the work of the Army was the attitude of many Easterners who
believed that the Indians were Rousseau's "Noble Savages," that the
Indians would best respond to· kindness, religious instruction, and training in agrarian methods. These idealists, whose concepts were largely
shaped by their distance from the atrocities being committed and by two
hundred years of forgetfulness about their own' forefathers' troubles with
the eastern tribes, as well as the methods those forefathers had employed to
solve the problem, began demanding a "peace policy" toward the natives.
Moreover, they wanted Army officers deprived of the right to act as Indian
agents, such positions going instead to men nominated by the various
religious denominations. When Ulysses S. Grant became president in
1869, these "experts" in Western Indian warfare got their wishes.
Also in transition at the end of the Civil War was the federal policy of
reservations for the Indians. By 1865 the government was committing itself
to the creation of many small reservations, as needed, for particular tribes,
restricting the Indians to as little land as they would settle for peacefully.
Instrumental in persuading the Indians to sign treaties accepting these
small reservations was the government's promise of an annual distribution
of presents and a regular ration of food. To distribute the rations and
presents, the Indian Bureau placed agents at each reservation, agents who
sometimes caused more problems than they solved. Opportunities for graft
were ever at hand, at the expense of the Indians, and corruption was rife.
Perhaps even harder for the Indians to take was the ignorance of such
men, for most agents neither knew nor cared about the Indians' customs,
laws, and civilization. Then, after Grant's peace policy was instituted, the
agents provided by the religious denominations frequently were so idealistic that they took no heed of the fact that some Indians were using the
reservations as convenient and safe resting places between raids. When
white settlers complained about raids, the agents swore that none of their
Indians had been involved.
Also complicating the situation in the Southwest was the Indian trader.
Such individuals all too frequently were shiftless characters who disregarded the government's injunction against the sale of liquor to the natives.
Even worse, the traders often supplied the Indians with arms and ammunition, then purchased from them the fruits of their raids, thereby supplying
the natives with both the means and the motive to jump the reservation to
loot and kill.
Despite such abuses, apologists for the Indians most often claimed that
white encroachment on reservation lands was the reason for unrest among
the natives. This argument had some validity in Oklahoma and the
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Dakotas, but not in the Southwest. In this region the population density
of Indians was so small and the whites who came so few in number that
only rarely did a settler covet reservation land or attempt to move onto
acres guaranteed to the Indians. The truth is that most Southwestern
tribes, especially the Apache, needed no excuse for making war on the
whites. These tribes had lived for centuries by murder and theft, riding
down their war trails as far south as Sinaloa and Durango in search of
booty and captives. The livestock a brave owned was the index for measuring his wealth, and usually his horses and mules were obtajned in raids. A
warrjor gained not only wealth but also social standjng by his success as a
thief. In addition, the Apache had adopted the Spanish-Mexican custom of
scalping, making it an important part of their warfare in order .to judge a
warrior's courage. A brave thus became a war chief of stature only by
gaining a reputation as a thief and a killer. That the whites were not to
blame for this social and economic structure can be seen from the fact that
the Indians not only fought Americans and Mexicans bUt also stole from
and warred upon other tribes. The whites whq came to the Southwest
found such beliefs contrary to their own laws and customs-in short, barbaric-and concluded that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian." The
native, on the one hand, was living as he had always lived and on his own
land; the whites posed for him a real physical and psychological threat.
The whites, on the other hand, believed that they owned the land by right
of conquest and that the Indians were not making productive use of it.
Might made right in that age, and the two races simply appealed to the
final arbiter of their era. It was a tragic clash of civilizations.
Dan Thrapp, who four years ago demonstrated his scholarship in Al
Sieber, Chief of Scouts, has traced the course of this confrontation with
sympathetic understanding for both Apache and white man. Combing
sources from New York to California, and most points in between, he has
produced a summary of the Apache wars that should stand the test of
historical judgment. His background as a journalist gives him a feeling for
words that makes the narrative How smoothly, while his documentation
speaks for jtself in footnotes and bibliography. Occasionally there is a lack
of balance when incidents, such as the Camp Grant Massacre, receive more
attention than they deserve-one suspects they were so dramatic. In total
the book is excellent. The University of Oklahoma Press has maintained
its usual high standard of bookmaking, producing a worthy addition to
every library of Western Americana.
Oklahoma State University
ODIE B. FAULK
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THE COUR'f-MAR'fIAL OF GENERAL GEORGE ARMSnONG CUS'fER. By
Lawrence A. Frost. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1968.
Pp; xvi, 280. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. $5.95.
DESP1'fE the title, this is really two books in one. The first, a detailed, comprehensive, and well-written account of the 7th Cavalry's participation in
General W. S. Hancock's 1867 Kansas Campaign, is complete in itself,
yet it also provides the background essential to the second, a verbatim
record of the court martial of Brevet Major General Custer in the late
summer of 1867.
With the exception of Lonnie White's article in the July 1966 issue of
the Journal of the West, the 1867 campaign has received scant attention
in most narratives of the Indian Wars. It is mentioned, if at all, only
briefly and rather inaccurately in histories of the Indian Wars, the Cavalry Arm, and the 7th Regiment. By generous reference to the observations and impressions recorded by Henry M. Stanley, a New York Tribune
correspondent (of later Africa fame) and Theodore R. Davis of Harper's
Weekly, both of whom accompanied the expedition, Doctor Frost has
brought a broader perspective to the incidents of the campaign than is
usually found in narratives of this type, which so often depend almost exclusively on military records and reports. Although unsuccessful in accomplishing its main objectives, the 1867 venture deserves its niche in
history as the first of the post-Civil War campaigns against the Plains
Indians. Had military and political leaders better appreciated and profited
by its lessons-to be oft repeated-the story of our Indian Wars might have
been somewhat different.
The verbatim record of Custer's court-martial, to the knowledge of this
reviewer hitherto unpublished, is a worthy addition to Custeriana if for
no other reason than clarification of the misconceptions and inaccuracies,
generally accepted and frequently reiterated in print, concerning this trial.
Custer was accused of a variety of military derelictions in eight specifications, of which three were in effect dismissed, and the weight of substantive evidence is questionable in three others.' Found guilty of the charges
preferred, he was sentenced to. a year's suspension from command with loss
of pay, exclusive of allowances, which amounted to $90 a month. Contrary to oft repeated assertions, he was not found guilty of disobeying
orders by making an unauthorized trip to Fort Riley to see his wife. More
serious, but apparently not so considered by the court, were the substantiated charges that he ordered fleeing deserters to be pursued and shot, resulting in the wounding of two and subsequent death of one of his soldiers,
although the Judge Advocate General in his review of the case pointed
out that in view of the mass desertions which were decimating Custer's
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command he may have considered this the only recourse left to insure its
future safety. When Custer was subsequently brought to trial before a civil
court charged with murder in connection with the soldier's death, the case
was dismissed. Some of the procedural actions of the court-martial and
several of its findings, even under the regulations of the time, seemed to
this long time veteran of courts-martial to be quite dubious.
A conscientious reader of the trial record may become confused when
comparing the wording of the specifications preferred against Custer with
the court's findings. Since Custer was found guilty of travel to Fort Harker
rather than to Fort Riley as initially charged, corresponding pen-and-ink
corrections were made in the original record of trial, but as this is not
explained in Dr. Frost's account, testimony during the trial referring to
Fort Riley tends to appear irrelevant. Regrettable, owing to a copying
oversight, is the omission of part of the verbatim record of the court's
findings. This makes it difficult to correlate them with the specifications
to which they refer. The inclusion of portions of the Judge Advocate
General's review of the trial-despite its rather revealing bias-would have
contributed a good discussion of the salient issues and considerations on
which General Grant's final approval of the sentence was based.
It is not apparent, as is sometimes alleged, that this trial was an attempt
to make Custer the scapegoat for Hancock's unproductive Indian hunt,
although it appears probable that the latter was mainly responsible for the
preferring of charges against Custer by that forgotten man of the 7th Cavalry, Colonel A. J. Smith, its first commander. A more likely motivation may
lie in the attitude of some older officers as expressed by Colonel Davidson
(initially a member of the court) that Custer was a young man-Ita newcomer in the service-only graduated in '6I-never commanded a company
-who must be taught he cannot come out here and do as he pleases."
Doctor Frost has done a worthy service in filling a gap in western military-Indian history and in presenting an item, not otherwise easily available,
of particular interest to Custer buffs. By forgoing any personal defense of
Custer or justification for his acts and permitting the trial record to speak
for itself, rather than summarizing it as others have done, he has generously allowed his readers to form their own conclusions as to Custer's guilt
and the punishment merited.
An appropriate selection of well reproduced photographs and four easily
readable maps complement the high quality of typography and binding
typical of the standards of the University of Oklahoma Press.
GEORGE RUHLEN
Alexandria, Va.
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
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LIFE OF GEORGE BENT, WRITTEN FROM HIS LETTERS. By George E. Hyde.
Ed. by Savoie Lottinville. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press,
1968. Pp. xxvi, 390. Illus., maps, bibliog., index. $5.95.
. WITH THE publication of this volume, scholars and general readers alike
have access to very important source material on the Great Plains frontier,
especially the closing years. And a very readable presentation it is, due to
the skill and knowledge of George E. Hyde and the editorial acumen of
Savoie Lottinville. The blending of Mr. Hyde's chronologically longer
working copy and the shorter but finished manuscript in the Western History Department, Denver Public Library, results in a noteworthy addition
to historical material on the American West. For all that, the real laurels
must go to the late George Bent himself, who died in 1918.- This son of
famed frontiersman William Bent and Owl Woman, a Cheyenne Indian,
was a rare and felicitous combination-an alert and literate man with a foot
in each camp, so to speak. He was born in 1843'
Apparently always with a strong predilection for the ways of his mother's
people, George Bent, however, never became so irreconcilably anti-white
as did his half-brother, Charles, the son of William Bent and Yellow
Woman, Owl Woman's sister. William Bent married the younger sister
after Owl Woman's death in childbirth. As a boy growing up at Bent's
Old Fort on the Arkansas River, George received impressions of life at the
trading emporium of Bent, St. Vrain and Company during the period
when the river ceased to be an international boundary line and after. Then
came residence and schooling at Westport, Missouri (1853-1857), and St.
Louis in 1860. In the next year the Civil War attracted George into the
Confederate forces, but his military experiences ended with his capture
by Union troops after the seige of Corinth, Mississippi, in 1862. Release
came through the influence of his elder brother, Robert, and the young
veteran returned to the country of the Upper Arkansas.
The changes there, with the promise of more to come, were the central
impression made upon George Bent. All the differences and newness
wrought by the gold rush to Colorado and the greatly expanded commerce, both civilian and military, on the Santa Fe Trail added up to a grim
future for the Cheyennes and other Plains tribes. From the spring of 1863
his life was spent with his mother's people, a decision that was confirmed
by the traumatic experience of the Sand Creek Massacre on November 29,
1864.
From that point on, it may be argued, Bent's prejudices enter in and
impair his reliability. Savoie Lottinville's annotations show, however, that
Bent's version and appraisal of numerous incidents are rarely very wide of
the mark. Furthermore, a strong case emerges for using official army re-
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ports with circumspection, although the reader also becomes aware of xenophobic distortions in Some of the Indian accounts as well.
This volume is important because it makes available many descriptions
of a vanished culture by a knowledgeable and sympathetic participant, who
ranged the plains from Montana to Texas. Bent's comments have influenced
other writings by George Hyde and, of course, George Bird Grinnell's works
on the Cheyennes, as well as more recent scholarship such as Donald J.
Berthrong's The Southern Cheyennes. In short, George Bent was an Indian
spokesman, a much needed article. We may look forward to Hyde and
LottinvilIe's edition of the George Bent letters.
Trinidad State Junior College
MORRIS F. TAYLOR

THE ENTERPRISING SCOT: INVESTORS IN THE AMERICAN WEST AFTER 1873.
By W. Turrentine Jackson. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University
Press, 1968. (N.A. Agent-Chicago: Alden Publishing Company.) Pp.
xvi, 416. IIlus., notes, tables, bibliog., index. $12.5°.
A LONG HELD, even cherished, image of the thrifty, wary, frugal, and canny
Scotsman needs modification, as Turrentine Jackson clearly demonstrates in
this scholarly, well-balanced, and thoroughly documented study. Though
they perhaps did not plunge to the level of other investors, the Scots still invested too rapidly, demanded quick and large dividends, and often, at the
earliest appearance of adversity, too hastily liquidated before carefully
analyzing the possible long-range economic possibilities of their holdings.
Professor Jackson covers a wide range of Scottish investments, from the
better-known cattle and mining companies to land mortgage companies.
While the 1870'S were the biggest decade in mining, cattle, and land promotion, the Scots conti'nued investing down to the mid-twentieth century. The
entire story is drawn against the rapidly changing economic and world situation of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Reflecting the investment pattern of the Scots, this work places its major emphasis on ranching
and mining. An excellent chapter on the Arizona Copper Company serves, in
a sense, as a case study of the methods, problems, and results of a foreignbased concern trying to operate in the United States. Particularly revealing
is the American reaction to Scottish investment.
Naturally focusing attention on the American situation, Jackson does not,
however, ignore the situation at home. The structure of the companies, leadership, stockholders' problems, and the gradual shift of the investment center
from Edinburgh to Glasgow, which had interesting ramifications on the pattern of investments, are thoughtfully examined. It would seem that very
little has been slighted. This book, coupled with Clark Spence's earlier study
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of British investors, gives to the general picture of foreign investment in the
western United States the scholarly attention it has so long needed.
In his preface Jackson states that he wrote this as a survey, "primarily to
introduce a field of research of sufficient magnitude to justify further inquiry." He has done this and more. The extensive use of American and
Scottish primary material, the grasp of the subject and conclusions will
make this an essential monograph for students and scholars of not only investments and economy, but mining, ranching, and the host of subjects
discussed by the author. It is not an easily read book, but then the subject
does not lend itself to sparkling prose. One complaint of this reviewer was
the smallness of the type, which tended to make the book more difficult
reading. The Enterprising Scot should deservedly take its place on the bookshelves or reading lists of all students of the Trans-Mississippi Frontier.
Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado
DUANE A. SMITH
MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERNITY. By Charles C. Cumberland. New
York: Oxford University Press; 1968. Pp. xii, 394. IlIus., maps, tables,
bibliog., index. $7.5°, cloth; $2.5°, paper.
THIS IS the best single volume covering the entire history of Mexico which
has yet appeared, despite the fact that the author accords this distinction to
Henry B. Parkes' A History of Mexico. Professor Cumberland did not set out
to write a general history for he states in the Preface: "This book is an attempt to clarify and to explain the social and economic issues which gave the
Mexican Revolution such a distinctive stamp, and to account for the direction and the nature of the change." Nevertheless, slightly more than a third
of the text and half of the chapters are devoted to the colonial period. Cumberland recognizes that to understand the Mexican Revolution one must
take into account the social, economic, and political forces that shape "attitudes [which] are the key to economic development and social change."
And that "revolutions of such ferocity are spawned by deep-seated ills, not
passing fancies." In so doing, the author has struck a blow for colonial history which warms the heart of this reviewer.
The opening chapter is an excellent condensation of geographical influences which have shaped and influenced the history of Mexico. Additional
chapters dealing with native population, colonial society, labor, and economics are fundamentally sound. The few errors are rriinor: e.g., attributing the
architectural marvels of Teotihuacan to the Toltec (p. 19) and rebellion
among the Huastec to the slaving policies of NUllO de Guzman (p. 45).
Cumberland avoids the amusing stories and. vignettes that surround Santa
Anna, Porfirio Diaz, and Pancho Villa. One Many Mexicos is enough. In the
period from Independence to the Revolution, the author gives a balanced
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treatment to both Juarez and Dfaz, and he presents the most impressive array
of statistics I have seen. Indeed, the statistical data constitute one of the
most valuable aspects of the book.
The Revolution and its aftermath are -the best chapters in the volume.
Cumberland's sympathies with the Revolution are apparent, but he presents
a careful analysis of the controversial issues between Church and State,
foreign capital and the Mexican government, the ejidal program versus
ownership of land in fee simple, etc. What at first appears to he an overly
optimistic treatment of post-Calles Mexico is tempered by the sober admission that since 1950 the impressive economic gains scored by Mexico
"have been funneled into a small segment of the population, with the vast
majority benefiting only slightly."
Political chronology, a welcome supplement in recent books, and a selective section on literature complete the book. The text is remarkably free of
misprints.
Cumberland has an easy style; his book may well replace Parkes as the
standard textbook for Mexican history.
North Texas State University
DONALD E. CHIPMAN

